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Abstract—Frequency hopping (FH) is an effective anti-
jamming technology in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). How-
ever, it is difficult to significantly increase the anti-jamming
results because of the growing crowded spectrum in wireless
communications. Orbital momentum angular (OAM) provides a
new mode dimension for anti-jamming without consuming extra
power and frequency resources in CRNs. In this paper, we pro-
pose the mode-frequency hopping (MFH) scheme, which jointly
uses the mode hopping and the traditional FH scheme for anti-
jamming to significantly increase the capacity of secondary users
(SUs). We derive the false alarm probability and transmission
outage probability for CRNs under our proposed MFH scheme.
Then, based on the two derived probabilities, we calculate the
capacity of SUs under the MFH scheme. Numerical results
show that our developed MFH scheme can achieve better anti-
jamming results as compared with the traditional FH scheme
in CRNs.
Index Terms—Orbital angular momentum (OAM), cognitive
radio networks (CRNs), mode hopping, frequency hopping (FH),
anti-jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
COGNITIVE radio (CR) is a promising technology for ef-ficient spectrum efficiency [1], [2] and with wide range
of applications [3], [4]. In cognitive radio networks (CRNs),
when the channel is not occupied by the primary users (PUs),
the secondary users (SUs) are allowed to access the licensed
idle channel for their own transmissions. However, because
of no licensed spectrum for SUs, highly dynamic spectrum
activities of PUs, and distribution of SUs, CRNs face severe
security challenges.
Academic researchers have paid much attention to the
security issues in CRNs [5]–[7]. Generally, PU emulation,
eavesdropping attack, and jamming attack are major attacks
in CRNs. The PU emulation is that the SUs disguise the PUs
and then access the licensed channels to transmit their own
signals [5], [6]. Thus, the required throughput of PUs cannot
be guaranteed in CRNs. A defense strategy using belief
propagation has been proposed against the PU emulation
attacker in CRNs, thus detecting effectively the PU emulation
attackers [6]. The jamming attacks, which make impact on the
availability of networks, send signals to the licensed channels
as interference without taking into account the existence of
SUs or PUs, thus resulting in the useless of the channel for
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both PUs and SUs [7]. By modeling the interaction between
SUs and attackers, a defense strategy using the Markov
decision process has been studied [7].
When the channel is jammed by attackers, we can use
the channel switching based on defense strategies in medium
access control (MAC) layer [6], [7] or the frequency hopping
(FH) in physical layer for anti-jamming in CRNs [8]–[11]. A
novel architecture has been proposed to implement an adap-
tive FH cognitive radio for current spectrum-limited environ-
ment [8]. In [9], the proposed adaptive multiple rendezvous
control channel based on FH aims at reducing the time to
rendezvous and increasing the overall network performance.
In addition, a few types of FH schemes and their properties
have been provided [11]. However, FH requires a relatively
wide bandwidth to hop. The growing crowded spectrum
makes FH difficult to guarantee the reliability of CRNs in
wireless networks. Hence, how to significantly increase the
anti-jamming results in physical layer of CRNs remains a
critical and open challenge.
Orbital angular momentum (OAM), which describes the
helical phase front of electromagnetic waves, has the potential
to achieve high spectrum efficiency [12], [13] and efficient
anti-jamming results without consuming extra power and
frequency resources in wireless communications [14]. Due to
the orthogonality among different OAM-modes, the proposed
mode hopping used for anti-jamming can achieve the same bit
error rate (BER) within the narrow band in comparison with
the traditional FH scheme. Also, the joint mode hopping and
the traditional FH scheme, which is called mode-frequency
hopping (MFH) scheme, can significantly decrease the BER
of radio vortex wireless communications [14].
To further enhance the anti-jamming results using the new
mode dimension for CRNs, in this paper we propose to use
MFH scheme for CRNs to increase the capacity of SUs.
First, based on the instantaneous signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) sensing threshold and transmission outage
threshold, we derive the false alarm probability corresponding
to the sensing phase and the transmission outage probability
corresponding to the transmission phase, respectively. Then,
based on the two derived probabilities, we calculate the ca-
pacity of SUs in CRNs under our proposed MFH scheme. We
conduct extensive numerical results to evaluate our developed
schemes, showing that the probability jammed by attacker
decreases and our developed MFH scheme can achieve higher
capacity for SUs than the traditional FH scheme.
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2The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II gives the MFH scheme based system model for CRNs.
Section III derives the false alarm probability, transmission
outage probability, and the capacity of SUs in CRNs under
our proposed MFH scheme. Section IV evaluates the MFH
scheme and compares it with the traditional FH in CRNs. The
paper concludes with Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the cognitive radio network, as depicted in
Fig. 1, which consists of the primary base station (BS),
the secondary BS, PUs, and SUs. The numbers of licensed
channels, OAM-modes, PUs, and SUs are denoted by N ,
L, Q, and M , respectively. Theoretically, the number of
OAM-modes L can be infinite. As shown in Fig. 1, PUs
transmit signal using the traditional plane-electromagnetic
waves in frequency domain while SUs transmit signal using
the vorticose electromagnetic waves in both frequency and
mode domains. Thus, NL channels can be selected by the
SUs to sense and then transmit their own signals within the
available channels. All channels are assumed to be indepen-
dent with each other. PUs have the high priority to access
each licensed channel, which follows an ON-OFF model with
the channel either busy (ON) or idle (OFF). The probabilities
that the states switch from ON to OFF and from OFF to ON
are denoted by ρ and %, respectively. In addition, PUs and
SUs follow the time-slotted structure, where PUs and SUs
are synchronized. A SU senses the presence of PUs at the
beginning of each time slot and then determines whether to
access the licensed channel or not.
We assume that the attackers don’t know the MFH pattern
of SUs and the FH pattern of PUs. Thus, it is difficult for
attackers to track the SUs and PUs in each time slot. Also,
we assume that the attackers don’t cooperate with each other.
As a result, a few attackers may jam the same SU at the same
time in CRNs. In addition, we assume that the attackers have
the same capabilities as SUs to sense and access the licensed
channels. The attackers randomly select a channel to jam.
SUs cooperate with each other in CRNs. Thus, SUs cannot
access or sense the same channel at the same time. Due to
lack of space, we mainly calculate the false alarm probability,
outage probability, and the capacity of SUs.
III. ANTI-JAMMING MFH SCHEME IN CRNS
In this section, we propose the MFH scheme for anti-
jamming in CRNs and derive the corresponding false alarm
probability, transmission outage probability, and the capacity
of SUs under our proposed MFH scheme. First, we derive the
false alarm probability corresponding to the sensing phase and
transmission outage probability corresponding to the trans-
mission phase. Then, based on the two derived probabilities,
we derive the capacity of SUs for CRNs under our proposed
MFH scheme.
A. False Alarm Probability
We denote by K the total number of malicious attackers in
CRNs and ϕ the azimuthal angle for attackers, PUs, and SUs.
Occupied spectrum 
frequency
Plane-electromagnetic wave
Vorticose electromagnetic wave
mode
The licensed spectrum bands
Primary users
Secondary base stationPrimary base stationSecondary users
Occupied channel by SUs Idle spectrum for SUsIdle channel for SUs
Fig. 1. The system model for cognitive radio networks under mode-frequency
hopping.
Since PUs transmit signals in frequency domain, the order
of PUs’ transmit signals is considered to be zero. Therefore,
when the SU senses the idle licensed channel for the 0 OAM-
mode corresponding to the n-th (n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1) band,
the SU’s sensing signal, denoted by yJ(t), can be expressed
as follows:
yJ(t) =
K∑
k=0
hksk(t)e
jϕlkej2pifkt + hpsp(t)e
j2pifnt + n(t),
(1)
where t is the time variable, hk, sk(t), lk, and fk are the
channel amplitude gain from the attacker’s transmitter to
the SU’s receiver, the transmit signal at the sensing phase,
the OAM-mode, and the carrier frequency, respectively, of
the k-th (k = 0, 1, · · · ,K) attacker. hp denotes the channel
amplitude gain from the PU’s transmitter to the SU’s receiver,
sp(t) denotes the transmit signal of the PU, fn represents the
carrier frequency of the n-th band, and n(t) the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean. When k = 0, it
means that there are no attackers at the sensing phase. Also,
we assume h0 = 0 and s0(t) = 0.
To decompose OAM-mode, the SU’s sensing signal yJ(t)
is multiplied with e−jϕl(l = 0, 1, · · · , L − 1) and then
passes through an integrator [14]. We assume that the transmit
signals of K˜s(K˜s = 0, 1, · · · ,K) attacker carry the same
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OAM-mode l as that of the SU. Thus, we have
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
yJ(t)e
−jϕldϕ=
K˜s∑
k=0
hksk(t)e
j2pifkt+hpsp(t)e
j2pifnt
+
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
n(t)e−jϕldϕ. (2)
Then, the signal passes through the band pass filter. Clearly,
only when both the carrier frequencies and OAM-modes of
attackers’ signals are the same with that of the SU required at
the sensing phase, the integrator and band pass filter cannot
fully cancel the interference. Otherwise, the interference can
be entirely removed by the integrator or band pass filter. We
assume that Ks(Ks = 0, 1, · · · ,K) attackers jam the SU’s
transmit signal at each sensing phase after passing through the
integrator and band pass filter. Thus, the SU’s sensing signal,
denoted by ys(t), after passing through the integrator and
band pass filter in CRNs under our proposed MFH scheme
can be expressed as follows:
ys(t) =
Ks∑
k=0
hksk(t) + hpsp(t) + n˜(t), (3)
where n˜(t) is the noise with zero mean and variance of σ2
after passing through the band pass filter.
We denote by PJ and Pp the transmit power of each
attacker and the PU, respectively. Based on Eq. (3), we can
calculate the instantaneous SINR of sensing, denoted by γs,
with Ks malicious attackers at the sensing phase in CRNs as
follows:
γs =
PJ
Ks∑
k=0
h2k + h
2
pPp
σ2
. (4)
Generally, SUs are extremely sensitive to the existence of PUs
in CRNs, which means that even though a PU occupying the
licensed channel has a very low instantaneous SINR, SUs
cannot be allowed to access the licensed channel to transmit
their own signal. Therefore, the sensing threshold of SU’s
instantaneous SINR, denoted by , is highly small in CRNs. If
the value of instantaneous SINR is larger than , it implies that
the licensed channel is busy and occupied by a PU or attackers
which disguise PUs. Thus, the SU must sense another licensed
channel for transmission. If the value of instantaneous SINR
is smaller than , it implies that the SU can access the idle
licensed channel.
Nakagami-m fading can be utilized in radio vortex wireless
communications, where m is the fading parameter. Based on
the probability density function (PDF) of channel amplitude
gain hk, the PDF of h2k, denoted by ph2k(h
2
k), can be derived
as follows:
ph2k(h
2
k) =
1
Γ(m)
(m
α
)m
h
2(m−1)
k e
−mh
2
k
α , (5)
where α is the expectation with respect to h2k and Γ(·) is the
Gamma function. We denote by h the sum of h2k from 1 to Ks,
i.e. h =
∑Ks
k=0 h
2
k. Since the fadings are mutually statistically
independent, h2k are statistically independent. Hence, based on
the analyses in MFH communications [14], we can derive the
joint PDF of
∑Ks
k=0 h
2
k, denoted by ph(h), as follows:
ph(h) =
mmKshmKs−1e−
mh
α
αmKsΓ(mKs)
, h ≥ 0. (6)
The PDF of h2p, denoted by ph2p(h
2
p), can be obtained by
replacing h2k by h
2
p in Eq. (5). Combining Eq. (4) and the
condition γs ≥ , we have
Ks∑
k=1
h2kPJ + h
2
pPp ≥ σ2. (7)
Based on Eqs. (6) and (7), we can derive the false alarm
probability, denoted by ps(,Ks,m), that Ks attackers jam
the SU’s sensing signal for CRNs, as shown in Eq. (8),
where G(a, b) represents the incomplete Gamma function for
corresponding elements of a and b and is given by
G(a, b) =
∫ b
0
za−1e−zdz. (9)
Assuming that NL licensed channels are idle for the SU,
malicious attackers randomly access these idle channels with
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∫ ∞
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. (18)
equal probability. Thus, the probability that an attacker ac-
cesses the same licensed channel with the SU is 1NL at the
transmission period.
The probability that there are Ks malicious attackers at the
sensing phase, denoted by PKs , in CRNs under our proposed
MFH scheme can be calculated as follows:
PKs =
( K
Ks
)(
1
NL
)Ks (
1− 1
NL
)K−Ks
. (10)
When SUs hop to the non-zero OAM-mode, the sensed signal
of SU, denoted by y˜s(t), after passing through the integrator
and band pass filter can be obtained as follows:
y˜s(t) =
Ks∑
k=0
hksk(t) + n˜(t). (11)
Similar to the analyse above, the corresponding false alarm
probability that Ks attackers jam the SU’s sensing signal,
denoted by p˜s(,Ks,m), in CRNs can be derived as follows:
p˜s(,Ks,m) = 1−
G(mKs,
mσ2
αPJ
)
Γ(mKs)
. (12)
Therefore, the average false alarm probability, denoted
by Ps, at the sensing phase for all possible Ks malicious
attackers in CRNs under our proposed MFH scheme can be
derived as follows:
Ps =
K∑
Ks=0
PKs
[
1
L
ps(,Ks,m) +
L− 1
L
p˜s(,Ks,m)
]
. (13)
B. Transmission Outage Probability
When the SU accesses the licensed channel, the SU’s
received signal, denoted by rJ(t), for the l-th OAM-mode
corresponding to the n-th band at the receiver can be ex-
pressed as follows:
rJ(t) = hsx(t)e
jϕlej2pifnt+
K∑
k=0
hkxk(t)e
jϕlkej2pifkt+n(t),
(14)
where hs, x(t), and xk(t) denote the channel amplitude gain
from the SU’s transmitter to the SU’s receiver, the transmit
signal of the SU, and the transmit signal of the k-th attacker at
the transmission phase. When k = 0, we assume that x0(t) =
0.
Then, similar to the analyses at the sensing phase, the
interfering signals with different OAM-modes or carrier fre-
quencies can be filtered after the received signal rJ(t) passing
through the integrator and band pass filter in CRNs under the
MFH scheme. We assume that the SU’s transmit signal can
be jammed by Kd (Kd = 0, 1, · · · ,K) attackers in CRNs
under our proposed MFH scheme. Thus, we can obtain the
SU’s received signal, denoted by rd(t), as follows:
rd(t) = hsx(t) +
Kd∑
k=0
hkxk(t) + n˜(t). (15)
Therefore, the received instantaneous SINR, denoted by γd,
with Kd attackers at the transmission phase in CRNs under
the MFH scheme can be derived as follows:
γd =
Pch
2
s
PJ
Kd∑
k=0
h2k + σ
2
, (16)
where Pc denotes the transmit power of each SU.
Due to the existence of attackers, the SU’s received SINR
will severely downgrade. The received SINR decreases as the
number of attackers increases. If the SU’s received SINR is
below the transmission instantaneous SINR threshold value,
denoted by η, the SUs’ transmit signal cannot be successfully
recovered, thus resulting in communication outage for the
SU. If γd ≥ η, it means that communications for the SU is
successful.
Based on Eq. (16) and the condition γd ≤ η, we can obtain
Pch
2
s
σ2
− ηPJH
σ2
≤ η, (17)
where H =
Kd∑
k=0
h2k.
The PDF of h2s, denoted by ph2s(h
2
s), can be obtained,
where we replace h2k by h
2
s in Eq. (5). The PDF of H , denoted
by pH(H), at the transmission phase can be obtained by
replacing h with H and Ks with Kd in Eq. (6), respectively.
Also, h2s and H are mutually independent. Thus, the trans-
mission outage probability, denoted by pd(η,Kd,m), that Kd
attackers jam the SU’s transmit signal can be calculated as
Eq. (18). Rayleigh fading is a special case of Nakagami-
5m, where m = 1. Thus, the transmission outage probability
pd(η,Kd,m) for Rayleigh fading can be rewritten as follows:
pd(η,Kd, 1) = 1− e−
ησ2
αPc
(
1 +
ηαPJ
Pc
)−Kd
. (19)
Also, we can obtain the probability, denoted by PKd , that
Kd malicious attackers jam the SU’s transmit signal simulta-
neously at the transmission phase in CRNs under the MFH
scheme as follows:
PKd =
( K
Kd
)(
1
NL
)Kd (
1− 1
NL
)K−Kd
. (20)
When no attackers jam the SU’s transmit signal, the trans-
mission outage probability is with the smallest value. We
can write the minimum transmission outage probability
pd(η,Kd,m) with no attackers in CRNs as follows:
pd(η, 0,m) =
G
(
m, mησ
2
αPc
)
Γ(m)
. (21)
C. Capacity in CRNs Under Our Proposed MFH Scheme
To clearly show that our developed MFH scheme in CRNs
can achieve better anti-jamming results, we consider to ana-
lyze the capacity of SUs. If the licensed channel is detected as
occupied by attackers, which disguise PUs, the SU will wait
until the licensed channel becomes idle and then transmits
signals. In the following, we derive the capacity of SUs under
our proposed MFH scheme for anti-jamming in CRNs.
The successful transmission probability of a SU, denoted
by psuc(Kd,m), with Kd malicious attackers at the transmis-
sion phase can be obtained as follows:
psuc(Kd,m) = (1− Ps)[1− Pd(η,Kd,m)]PKd . (22)
Then, the instantaneous capacity, denoted by CMFH , of the
SU for all possible Kd can be derived as follows:
CMFH =
K∑
Kd=0
psuc(Kd,m)B log2(1 + γd), (23)
where B represents the bandwidth of each channel. For
Nakagami-m fading, the PDF of SINR, denoted by pγ(γ),
can be expressed as follows:
pγ(γ) =
1
Γ(m)
(
m
γ¯
)m
γm−1e−
mγ
γ¯ , (24)
where γ denotes the SINR of channel and γ¯ denotes the
average SINR.
Therefore, we can obtain the capacity, denoted by C, of all
SUs for all possible Kd malicious attackers in CRNs under
our proposed MFH scheme as follows:
C = MB
K∑
Kd=0
psuc(Kd)Eγ [log2(1 + γd)] , (25)
where Eγd(·) represents the expectation operation with re-
spect to γd.
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Fig. 2. The capacity of SUs versus the SINR sensing threshold  in CRNs
under our proposed MFH scheme.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performances of our pro-
posed scheme and compare the capacities of our developed
MFH scheme with the conventional FH scheme in CRNs.
Throughout our evaluations, we set the number of available
carriers as 2, the transmit power of each attackers as 0.1 W,
the number of SUs as 4, and the bandwidth as 10 MHz.
Figure 2 shows the capacity of SUs versus the instanta-
neous SINR sensing threshold  in CRNs under our proposed
MFH scheme, where we set the total number of attackers
as 2, the number of available OAM-modes as 8, and the
transmission threshold η as 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, and 0.35,
respectively. As shown in Fig. 2, the capacity of SUs in-
creases as the instantaneous SINR sensing threshold increases
and transgression threshold decreases. This is because the
false alarm probability at the sensing phase decreases as 
increases, thus resulting in the increase of the probability
that SUs access the licensed channel. Also, the transmission
outage probability at the transmission phase decreases as η
decreases. Therefore, the successful transmission probability
of SUs increases. In addition, we can see that the capacity
of SUs is very close to a fixed value as  increases. These
results prove that we can get large SUs’ capacity with small
transmission threshold and big instantaneous SINR sensing
threshold in CRNs under our developed MFH scheme.
Figure 3 depicts the capacity of SUs versus the channel
SINR with respect to different number of malicious attackers
in CRNs under the MFH, where we set the instantaneous
SINR sensing threshold  as 0.1, transmission threshold η
as 0.3, the number of available OAM-modes as 2, and the
number of attackers as 0, 2, 4, 8, and 16, respectively. When
the number of attackers is zero, it means that SU’s sensing
and transmission work without interference from attackers.
The capacity of SUs increases as the channel SINR increases.
Also, the capacity of SUs decreases as the number of attackers
increases. The increase of attackers leads to the increase of
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Fig. 3. The capacity of SUs versus the channel SINR with respect to different
number of malicious attackers in CRNs under the MFH scheme.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 10
7
Fig. 4. The capacity comparison between our developed MFH scheme and
the conventional FH in CRNs versus the channel SINR.
SINR at the sensing phase and decrease of SINR at the
transmission phase. Hence, the false alarm probability at the
sensing phase and the transmission outage probability at the
transmission phase increase, which also results in the decrease
of capacity for SUs. Therefore, CRNs under our developed
MFH scheme can achieve high capacity with the decrease of
attackers in high channel SINR region.
Figure 4 compares the capacities of SUs between our
developed MFH scheme and the conventional FH schemes
in CRNs, where we set the instantaneous SINR sensing
threshold  as 0.1, transmission threshold η as 0.3, the number
of attackers as 2, and the number of available OAM-modes
as 1, 2, 4, and 8, respectively. Observing Fig. 4, we can see
that the capacity increases as the number of OAM-modes
increases. The reason is that the increase of OAM-modes
makes malicious attackers difficult to track the SUs, thus
reducing the probability to jam the SUs. When there is only
one OAM-mode to hop and the order of the OAM-mode is
zero, it means that our developed MFH scheme is equivalent
to the conventional FH scheme in CRNs. Clearly, the capacity
of SUs using our developed MFH scheme is larger than that of
using the conventional FH in CRNs. These results prove that
our developed MFH scheme can achieve better anti-jamming
results than the conventional FH in CRNs.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed to use the MFH scheme for
better anti-jamming results in CRNs. We derived the false
alarm probability corresponding to the sensing phase and
the transmission outage probability corresponding to the
transmission phase. Based on the two derived probabilities,
we calculated the capacity of SUs in CRNs under the MFH
scheme. Numerical results show that the capacity of SUs
using the MFH scheme is higher than that of using the
conventional FH scheme in CRNs.
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